Qualified Immunity Remains Strong as Courts Continue to Define Constitutional Boundaries

By Stephen DiNolfo

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359 (7th Cir. 2025) offers an important reminder about how qualified immunity operates in federal civil rights litigation. Even when a court identifies conduct that could violate the Constitution, officers may still be protected from personal liability if the law was not “clearly established” at the time. The U.S. Supreme Court recently declined to review the case, leaving the Seventh Circuit’s decision in place and reaffirming qualified immunity remains strong.

The Facts

Smith arose from events at a correctional institution during an inmate’s prolonged hunger strike. After the inmate repeatedly refused orders to leave his cell for medical evaluations, prison officials used pepper spray during a cell extraction. The inmate, who had asthma, alleged that officers knew he had a medical contraindication to pepper spray. Following the extraction, officers placed him in a control cell for approximately 23 hours. According to the inmate’s version of events, he remained naked in a cell exposed to temperatures ranging roughly from 25 to 57 degrees Fahrenheit without clothing, bedding, or other means of keeping warm.

The inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit began by reiterating the familiar two-step qualified immunity inquiry, where courts ask:

(1) Whether the facts show a constitutional violation; and (2) Whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Significantly, the court chose to address both questions rather than decide the case solely on qualified immunity grounds. The panel explained that doing so helps develop constitutional precedent and provide guidance for future cases.

On both the pepper-spray claim and the conditions-of-confinement claim, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find an Eighth Amendment violation. The court observed that the inmate presented evidence that he posed little immediate threat, had been extracted successfully on prior occasions without pepper spray, and was in a weakened condition due to his hunger strike. A jury could therefore conclude that the use of pepper spray lacked a legitimate purpose.

The court reached a similar conclusion regarding the confinement claim. It reiterated that inmates have a constitutional right to protection against extreme cold and that warmth qualifies as a basic human need. Viewing the evidence in the inmate’s favor, a jury could find that officers knowingly left him exposed to freezing temperatures without clothing or bedding despite requests for assistance.

Despite finding that a jury could identify constitutional violations, the Seventh Circuit held that qualified immunity barred recovery on both claims. The court stressed that clearly established law must place the constitutional question “beyond debate.” In excessive-force cases especially, courts must examine the specific facts confronting the officer rather than rely on broad legal principles.

As to the pepper-spray claim, the court found no controlling precedent that would have made it clear to every reasonable correctional officer that using pepper spray under these particular circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment.

Likewise, on the cold-cell claim, the court acknowledged prior cases recognizing inmates’ rights to protection from extreme cold. However, it found no sufficiently analogous case involving confinement for approximately 23 hours in temperatures ranging from 25 to 57 degrees without clothing or bedding. Because the court concluded that existing precedent did not squarely govern the specific facts, qualified immunity applied.

Judge Hamilton penned a sharp dissent. He agreed that the inmate had presented evidence of an Eighth Amendment violation but disagreed with granting qualified immunity on the cold-cell claim. In his view, existing precedent had already made clear that deliberately exposing a naked prisoner to extreme cold was unconstitutional. He criticized what he viewed as an overly rigid search for factually identical precedent and argued that some constitutional violations are sufficiently obvious that no case on all fours is required.

The Supreme Court Declines Review

The inmate asked the United States Supreme Court to take up the case. However, on June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court denied his application. Interestingly, this routine decision generated a dissent from Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. They believed that the officers should not have received qualified immunity on the cold-cell claim. As they saw it, longstanding Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent already established that prison officials may not deliberately deprive inmates of basic human needs such as warmth. In their view, the Seventh Circuit erred by requiring a prior case matching the exact combination of temperature, duration, and conditions present in Smith.

Why This Matters for Law Enforcement

For law enforcement officers and correctional personnel, Smith v. Kind underscores two important points.

First, qualified immunity remains a powerful defense. Even where a court believes conduct may have crossed a constitutional line, officers are entitled to immunity unless existing precedent clearly established the unlawfulness of the conduct at the time.

Second, constitutional law continues to develop through these decisions. Although the officers ultimately prevailed, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that a jury could find the alleged conduct unconstitutional. Future officials confronting similar circumstances may not receive the same protection if subsequent cases further clarify the constitutional boundaries.

In sum, Smith v. Kind is both a qualified-immunity victory and a warning. The officers prevailed because the law was not clearly established in 2017. After Smith, however, the constitutional limits on the use of force against medically vulnerable inmates and exposure to severe cold have been defined with far greater specificity.